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Abstract 
Cognitive errors about gambling games, probability and chance outcomes can contribute to the 
incidence of gambling-related harm in vulnerable individuals. Illusions of control (IOC) – beliefs 
that actions or rituals can influence ostensibly probabilistic game outcomes – are typically 
studied using questionnaires, think-aloud methods, or inferred from shifts in betting patterns 
following manipulations of IOC. However, naturalistic studies of dice-based games (e.g., 'Craps') 
suggest that IOC can be manifest in players' motor actions: e.g., rolling the dice hard to hit 
higher value outcomes. Here, in three experiments, we investigated the action-based expression 
of IOC while rolling a single computer-simulated die for monetary prizes in samples of 
community-recruited gamblers. We report (i) that action-based expressions of IOC are dependent 
on the congruence of game features (i.e., larger winning numbers linked to larger value prizes); 
(ii) that action-based expressions of IOC can reflect the joint betting of gambling co-actors (as a 
form of 'illusion of control by proxy') and (iii) that prior induction of motor-caution can weaken 
the links between the action-based expression of IOC and gamblers' self-report beliefs that game 
outcomes can be controlled. These data indicate that gambling-related IOC can be expressed in 
the action repetoires afforded by gambling games; can reflect their structural features and social 
contexts; and can be disrupted by the modulation of inhibitory control over motor behaviour.  
 
Keywords: problem gambling, cognitive behavioural therapy, betting, erroneous cognitions 
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Introduction 
Cognitive biases and errors about gambling games can promote the development and 
maintenance of harmful patterns of gambling (Delfabbro, 2004; Toneatto, Blitz-Miller, 
Calderwood, Dragonetti, & Tsanos, 1997). They also constitute helpful therapeutic targets for 
cognitive behavioural interventions for gambling problems (Fortune & Goodie, 2012; Ladouceur 
et al., 2003; Ladouceur et al., 2001). However, at the current time, surprisingly little is known 
about how cognitive biases and errors are expressed in the actions afforded by gambling games 
(Martinez, Bonnefon, & Hoskens, 2009). Learning more could help us to improve therapeutic 
interventions and, perhaps, identify more effective harm-minimsation interventions. 
 
One of the most salient of gambling-related cognitive errors are illusions of control (IOC) 
(Langer, 1975). IOC involve beliefs that particular actions, prayer, the use of lucky numbers, 
rituals or charms can influence the outcomes of chance-based games (Raylu & Oei, 2004; 
Rothbaum, Weisz, & Snyder, 1982), and are strengthened in individuals with gambling problems 
compared to healthy controls (Moore & Ohtsuka, 1999; Myrseth, Brunborg, & Eidem, 2010; 
Raylu & Oei, 2004; Xian et al., 2008). A large number of experiments indicate the dependence 
of gamblers' IOC on several situational factors. First, active involvement – defined as a “physical 
interaction with the gambling device, which triggers the (quasi) immediate resolution of the 
gamble” (Martinez et al., 2009, p. 1063) can enhance IOC. Active involvement relate to actions 
in games such as the picking of cards from a deck or balls from a container, or rolling of dice 
(Chau & Phillips, 1995; Davis, Sundahl, & Lesbo, 2000; Dunn & Wilson, 1990; Fernandez-
Duque & Wifall, 2007; Martinez et al., 2009; Strickland, Lewicki, & Katz, 1966). 
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Second, IOC in gamblers, like other populations (E J Langer, 1975), appear to depend upon the 
perception that ostensibly chanced-based games actually involve ill-defined forms of skill, 
exemplified by observations that  gamblers provided with a stopping device on electronic 
gambling machines report strengthened IOC and lengthen gambling sessions (Ladouceur & 
Sevigny, 2005). Finally,  IOC in gamblers can be sensitive to the motivational properties of game 
outcomes. Gamblers who expected painful electric shocks on losing roulette plays were more 
likely to attempt to control game outcomes using a braking device compared with gamblers who 
were not under the threat of electric shocks (Friedland, Keinan, and Regev, 1992). 
 
Like other gambling-related erroneous cognitions, IOC has traditionally been measured using 
self-report (Raylu & Oei, 2004; Steenbergh, Meyers, May, & Whelan, 2002); or 'think aloud' 
methods that capture verbal reports of the thoughts that come to mind whilst playing gambling 
games (Delfabbro & Winefield, 1999, 2000; Griffiths, 1994; Ladouceur, Gaboury, Bujold, 
Lachance, & Tremblay, 1991; Walker, 1992); or inferred from shifts in betting strategies 
following manipulations that strengthen (or weaken) IOC in chance-based games (Langer 1975; 
Burger and Cooper 1979; Strickland et al. 1966). These techniques reflect the conceptualisation 
of IOC as explicit mental or cognitive structures that represent non-veridical beliefs about the 
potential impacts of personal actions upon the outcomes of gambling games.  
 
In particular contexts, however, IOC can be seen in gamblers’actions within gambling games. 
Early observational work reported that street-side and casino gamblers sometimes throw dice in 
different ways in order to achieve or 'hit' specific game outcomes. For example, some 'craps' 
players report the belief that throwing dice harder tends to produce higher value outcomes while 
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throwing gently produces lower value outcomes (Henslin, 1967)i. These observations link to the 
practice of 'dice-setting' (e.g., http://www.dicecoach.com/dicesets.asp) that purports to offer 
ways to increase the probabilities of certain game outcomes by careful orientation and angled 
throws of the dice. More prosaically, our common experience includes children (and sometimes 
adults) throwing dice harder or softer while trying to 'hit' (or avoid) certain outcomes (e.g. 
'Double-6' or 'Go-to-Jail') in family board games. These observations suggest that IOC could, in 
some circumstances at least, be expressed and measured through gamblers’ actions.  
 
Previously, we used an experimental 'analogue' model to explore action-based IOC in which 
gamblers were invited to roll a simulated fair 6-sided die for monetary prizes (Lim, Bowden-
Jones, & Rogers, 2014). As expected, and in line with the above observations, we demonstrated 
for the first time that a sample of (broadly non-problematic) community-recruited gamblers 
allowed a single computer-simulated die to roll for longer durations when trying to 'hit' larger 
winning numbers with larger value prizes compared with trying to hit smaller value winning 
numbers with smaller value prizes (Lim et al., 2014). These observations demonstrate action-
based expressions of IOC as gamblers vary die-rolls to (somehow) exercise control over game 
outcomes. These value-dependent behaviours appear analogous to the way that some gamblers' 
modulate their dice rolls within casinos or street-games (Henslin, 1967; Davis, 2000) and 
demonstrate that IOC, expressed in motor behaviours, can be captured in the laboratory.  
 
Here, we extend our understanding of action-based expressions of IOC in three experiments. 
First, the association of longer roll-times of a simulated die with larger winning numbers and 
prizes suggests that IOC may reflects a stimulus-response compatibility where the actions 
Commented [A1]: Matthew, I can’t find any reference to So-Jo; 
is it a commenrcial gambling game? R 
Commented [A2]: You definitely need to leave this in - R 
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afforded by a gambling game are coupled to its structural characteristics through shared 
cognitive representations of magnitude (Andres et al., 2004; Kornblum et al., 1990; Lindemann 
et al., 2007; Walsh, 2003). Therefore, Experiment 1 investigated directly whether stimulus-
response compatibility underlies the observed action-based expressions of IOC found previously 
(Lim et al., 2014) by manipulating the congruency of a dice-based game's structural 
characteristics and then testing their impact on action-based expressions of IOC. 
 
In line with previous IOC investigations (Langer, 1975), Experiment 2 investigates whether 
action-based expressions of IOC are susceptible to social facilitation effects by which gamblers’ 
perceptions of, and behaviour in, games are modulated by the presence or absence of others 
(Cole, Barrett, & Griffiths, 2011; Rockloff & Dyer, 2007). Social facilitation can alter gamblers’ 
attribution of others' personal skills or control by drawing attention to their successes in 
gambling games as in so-called IOC 'by proxy' (Wohl & Enzle, 2009). Social facilitation has 
been observed in shifts towards risky betting patterns in children and adults (Caron & 
Ladouceur, 2003; Cole et al., 2011; Dykstra & Dollinger, 1990; Hardoon & Derevensky, 2001; 
Le Floch, Martinez, & Gaffie, 2005; Rockloff & Dyer, 2007) and the effect appears to be dose-
dependent, increasing incrementally with the number of other individuals participating in games 
(Rockloff, Greer, & Fay, 2011). Experiment 2, therefore, introduced a 2-player die-rolling game 
– the 'Bone Game' – to examine whether the action-based expressions of IOC in games of dice 
are enhanced by social facilitation and/or encompass IOC by proxy (Wohl & Enzle, 2009).  
 
Finally, Experiment 3 completes this series by testing whether it is possible to moderate action-
based expression of IOC. If gamblers' IOC can be expressed in the motor actions of dice-based 
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games, it should be possible to modulate their expression by manipulating individuals' motor set. 
Motor-caution training can be achieved by completing a stop-signal task that involves repeatedly 
cancelling an intended motor action in response to imperative stimuli (Verbruggen, Adams, & 
Chambers, 2012). Induction of motor-caution can transiently reduce risky betting patterns in 
gambling games (Stevens et al., 2015; Verbruggen et al., 2012; Verbruggen et al., 2013). More 
broadly, motor inhibitory training interventions can alter impulsive health-related and appetitive 
behaviours (Allom, Mullan, & Hagger, 2016; Jones et al., 2016). This is important as individuals 
with gambling problems sometimes show poor inhibitory control (Billieux et al., 2012; Brevers 
et al., 2012; Goudriaan, Oosterlaan, De Beurs, & Van Den Brink, 2006). Taken together, these 
findings raise the possibility that an induced state of motor caution (Jahfari, Stinear, Claffey, 
Verbruggen, & Aron, 2010) will disrupt action-based IOC and disrupt self-reported beliefs in the 
controlabilty of chance-based games. This is explored in Experiment 3. 
  
Experiment 1: Illusions of control and game prize structure  
Observations that regular (broadly non-problem) gamblers will allow a computer-simulated die 
to roll for longer while trying to hit higher value winning numbers and prize values suggest that 
IOC can depend upon the correspondences between actions afforded by gambling games and 
their prize structures as a form of  stimulus-response compatibility (Lim et al., 2014). Other data 
indicate that hand grasping actions are executed faster and with more force when large numbers, 
rather than small numbers, are presented (Andres et al., 2004; Lindemann et al., 2007) 
 
In Experiment 1, community-recruited regular (but broadly non-problem) gamblers were 
randomised to three groups. In one 'congruent' group, participants rolled a single computer-
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simulated die where prize values perfectly mapped onto target winning numbers (10p for rolling 
the winning number of '1'…and 60p for rolling the winning number of '6'). In another 
'incongruent' group, the winning numbers increased from 1 to 6 but the mapped prize values now 
decreased (60p for the winning number of '1', 50p for the wining number '2'…and 10p for the 
winning number of '6'). Finally, in the 'neutral' group, prizes were 35p regardless of winning 
number (i.e. 35p for numbers between '1' and '6'). Reflecting Lim et al. (2014), we tested the 
prediction that action-based expression of IOC will be strengthened in participants of the 
congruent group but weakened in the participants of the 'incongruent' group for whom the 
correspondence between the game features and actions is substantially degraded.  
 
Method 
Experiment 1 (and Experiments 2 and 3) were approved by the Central University Research 
Ethics Committee of ????? University. All participants gave written informed consent. 
 
Participants 
Sixty male adults were recruited from the local community in Oxford, UK, using advertisements 
placed on a community website for male gamblers. We recruited male gamblers only since males 
report a higher number of gambling-related cognitive biases compared to female gamblers 
(Raylu & Oei, 2004; Wardle et al., 2010). Participants were asked how frequently they took part 
in a variety of online and offline gambling activities (but excluding lottery and scratch cards) that 
are common in this population. Gambling participation was computed by the total frequency of 
participation across all gambling activities in the past year. Thirty-eight participants (63.4%) 
reported gambling at least once a week, 18 (30%) gambled 1-3 times a month, and 4 (6.7%) 
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gambled at least a few times a year. Our results provide new information about the role of motor 
actions in the IOC of male individuals with varying gambling involvement (Table 1).  
 
Clinical and psychometric assessments 
Participants in Experiment 1 (as well as Experiments 2 and 3) were excluded if they screened 
positive for past-month DSM-IV psychological disorders using SCID-I/P (First, Spitzer, Gibbon, 
& Williams, 2002). Non-verbal cognitive ability was assessed using the Raven’s Progressive 
Matrices (Raven, 2000). These standardised scores were included as a control regressor in all of 
the subsequent analyses since decision-making, visual scanning, motor speed and motor 
dexterity can depend upon cognitive ability in adults (Barry & Petry, 2008), and could have 
influenced the variability of gamblers’ active involvement in our die-rolling game. 
 
Structured Clinical Interview for Pathological Gambling (SCI-PG; Grant, Steinberg, Kim, 
Rounsaville, & Potenza, 2004). Gambling problems were assessed with the SCI-PG. Three 
participants were identified as probable pathological gamblers (SCI-PG score ≥ 5), distributed 
one each across the three participant groups. Their removal did not change the pattern or 
statistical reliability of our findings and so were retained in our sample. 
 
Gambling Related Cognitions Scale (GRCS; Raylu & Oei, 2004). Participants completed the 
GRCS and its illusions of control (GRCS-IOC) subscale scores were used in the analyses. The 
GRCS-IOC assesses instrumental, superstitious behaviours such as 'I have specific rituals and 
behaviours that increase my chances of winning'. The GRCS-IOC subscale score demonstrated 
good internal consistency in this sample (as Cronbach’s α = .85). 
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Table 1 about here 
 
Dice-control Scale.  Participants completed a bespoke scale adapted from previous work 
(Ladouceur & Sevigny, 2005) to measure self-reported IOC beliefs in our die-rolling game. Four 
items were rated on a 7-point Likert scale, with the anchor points of 'Strongly disagree' and 
'Strongly Agree': (i) 'Players can influence the die after having activated the play button'; (ii) 
'There is a method for controlling the outcome of the die after the play button has been activated'; 
(iii) 'A winning outcome is due to skill or a combination of skill and chance'; and (iv) 'There are 
strategies that could enable players to increase their chances of winning after the play button has 
been activated'. Total scores showed good internal consistency (Cronbach’s α=.91). 
 
Die-rolling game 
Participants played a computerised die-rolling game with a single 6-sided computer-simulated 
die for monetary prizes. The game lasted for about 6mins. Participants were informed that the 
animated die was ‘fair’ and that they would keep the monetary value of their winnings as a cash 
pay-out. On each play, participants were first shown an array of the standard six die faces 
displayed from left-to-right in middle of a standard computer display (Figure 1a). Next, an 
auditory message, played through a speaker positioned next to the computer, indicated a 
randomly-selected target winning number. Participants registered that they understood the target 
number for that play by clicking on the prize value displayed above the winning number. 
Following this, participants clicked down on the mouse again to initiate a simulated roll of the 
die. While the mouse was depressed down, the die spun and bounced off the walls of a green box 
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positioned in the middle of the display. Participants could roll the die for as long or as short a 
duration as they liked before releasing the mouse click to 'throw' the die. After releasing the 
mouse, the animated die-roll slowed down and comes to a stop. 
 
If the thrown number matched the target winning number, 'WIN #p!' (where '#' indicated the 
prize value) was displayed in white, accompanied by the sound of a coin falling onto a table, to 
indicate that the prize has been won. If the thrown number did not match the winner number, 
'MISS!' was displayed in red, accompanied by a lower frequency audio jingle indicating a loss. 
The die-rolling game involved no stakes and participants were informed that the monetary value 
of their winnings would be added to their participation fee. Participants were told that the die 
was fair. However, the game was programmed so that 18 out of a total of 72 plays (25%) rather 
than 12 out of 72 plays (16.7%) resulted in winning outcomes. This minor deception helped to 
ensure a sufficient number of winning outcomes per cell across the six die-face values.  
 
Figure 1 about here 
Procedure 
Participants attended the laboratory, completed the SCI-PG and the self-report questionnaires 
before being randomised to one of three experimental groups of the die-rolling game: (i.e., 
congruent, incongruent, or neutral). Following completion of the die-rolling game, participants 
completed the Dice-control Scale and collected their winnings before being discharged. 
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Data Analysis 
One-way Analysis of Variance (ANOVAs) and Pearson χ2 tests were used to test whether 
demographic and gambling characteristics differed across the experimental groups. Non-
parametric Kruskal-Wallis tests were used where any variable was not normally distributed. 
 
All significance values were taken at p < .05. 
 
Our die-rolling game afforded one dependent measure: the duration of die-roll times (ms). Data 
analysis was completed in two major steps. First, mixed-effects models were used to regress log-
transformed die-roll times against the following game features: (i) the (winning) target values 
(i.e., 1 to 6); (ii) the values of prizes won or lost on the previous play (to control for changes in 
roll-times following play outcomes); and (iii) the play number to control for fluctuating 
engagement across the entire length of the game. Gamblers’ intercepts and the coefficients for 
regressors (i) and (iii) were allowed to vary, as random effects, across participants. 
 
Second, to test the hypothesised action-based expression of IOC within each experimental group, 
one-sample t-tests were conducted on the -coefficients linking between die-roll times and target 
value from the previous regression models. These -coefficients were then  regressed against two 
dummy variables created for the (a) congruent and (b) incongruent participant groups (against 
the ‘neutral’ group as the referent). Additional regressors included (c) total scores on the Dice-
control Scale; (d) self-reported IOC (as GRCS-IOC sub-scale scores); (e) participants’ age; and 
(f) non-verbal cognitive ability. An additional model added (g) the two-way interaction between 
participant group (congruent, incongruent vs neutral) and Dice-control scores. 
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Results 
The three groups were well-matched in terms of their demographic characteristics and gambling 
behaviours (all p>.05) (Table 1). As expected, overall, participants tended to allow the simulated 
die to roll for longer when attempting to achieve higher winning values, b=0.018, 95% CI 
[<0.001, 0.037], SE=.009 (Fig. 1b). Working back from the log-transformed data, this equates to 
an increase in die-roll times of ≈22ms for every integer increase in the target winning number. 
Die-roll times tended to shorten as the game progressed, b=-0.003, 95% CI [-0.005, -0.001], 
SE=0.001, possibly reflecting lowered engagement. Roll times were not much influenced by 
winning or losing outcomes on the previous play, b=-0.002, 95% CI [-0.014, 0.001], SE=0.006.   
 
One-sample t-tests against baseline of 0 revealed that participants in both the neutral group and 
the congruent group significantly extended the durations of their die-rolls with larger target 
values, t(19)=2.89, p<.01, Cohen’s d=.65 and t(19)= 2.43, p<.05, Cohen’s d=.54, respectively. 
By contrast, participants in the incongruent group did not roll the die for longer or shorter when 
trying to hit large target winning values, t(19)=-1.03, p=.32, Cohen’s d=.23.  
 
Participants in the neutral group showed significantly stronger associations between their die 
roll-times and winning targets than the participants in the incongruent group, b= -0.035, 95% CI 
[-0.063, -0.008], SE=0.014 (Figure 1b and Model 1 in Table 2). By contrast, the strengths of 
association between die roll-times and target winning number in the neutral and congruent 
participant did not significantly differ from each other, b=0.010, 95% CI [-0.018, 0.037], 
SE=0.014. Across all three groups, longer die-rolls when attempting to 'hit' larger winning 
numbers was strongly associated with participants' beliefs that they had at least some control 
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over the outcomes of the simulated die, b=0.004, 95% CI [0.002, 0.007], SE=0.001. However, 
this relationship did not substantially differ across experimental group: congruent vs neutral 
participants, b<0.001, 95% CI [-0.007, 0.006], SE=0.003, and incongruent vs neutral 
participants, b=-0.002, 95% CI [-0.007, 0.004], SE=0.003 (Model 2 in Table 2). 
 
Table 2 about here 
 
Discussion 
This experiment replicates the findings of Lim et al. (2014) by demonstrating that community-
recruited gamblers can express IOC by allowing a computer-simulated die to roll for longer 
while trying to 'hit' larger winning numbers and/or higher value monetary prizes. However, these 
data extend those earlier findings by demonstrating that it is possible to disrupt these action-
based IOC by manipulating the congruency between structural game features (as the magnitudes 
of winning numbers and prize values). Finally, the observation that participants' β-coefficients 
for the association between die-roll durations and target winning numbers/prizes were linked to 
beliefs that they could exert at least some influence over outcomes suggests IOC can reflect the 
degree of active involvement observed in dice-rolling games (Henslin, 1967; Davis, 2000).  
 
Experiment 1 examined the dependence of action-based IOC upon structural characteristics of 
dice-rolling games. Other data indicate that gambling behaviours are sensitive to social 
faciliators (Caron & Ladouceur, 2003; Cole et al., 2011; Dykstra & Dollinger, 1990; Hardoon & 
Derevensky, 2001; Le Floch, Martinez, & Gaffie, 2005; Rockloff & Dyer, 2007) and that the 
gambling successes of others can promote IOC 'by proxy' (Wohl & Enzle, 2009). Experiment 2 
15 
 
considers whether the action-based expression of IOC can modulated by the participation of 
gambling co-actors who can bet on either the same or different outcomes of the die-rolling game. 
 
Experiment 2: Illusions of control and social facilitation effects in 
the 'Bone Game' 
Community-recruited gamblers played a 2-player dice-rolling game in pairs. Sometimes, 
gamblers placed a small stake or bet on 'hitting' named winning numbers (as the 'shooter') for 
small monetary prizes. At other times, they were given the opportunity to place a small bet on 
either the same winning numbers as their partner (now acting as the 'shooter') or on a different 
winning number. On each play, the house stipulated a 'Bone' number that forfeited both stakes 
and signalled that the two players should swap roles. This design allowed us to test, using each 
gambler as his own control, the prediction that the association between gamblers' die-rolls and 
target winning numbers (when acting as the shooter) are strengthened when their betting partners 
bet on the same winning numbers (but weakened when their partners place bets on different 
numbers). We also tested whether the moderation of gamblers' action-based IOC by partners' 
betting patterns was linked to their rated beliefs in being able to control outcomes.  
 
Method 
Participants 
Thirty-six male gamblers were recruited in the same way as Experiment 1. Four participants 
were excluded from the final analysis ( to leave an n of 32) because of idiosyncratic behaviours 
of betting partners who placed bets on the same outcome as the 'shooter' on less than 10% of the 
plays. Sixteen participants (50%) reported gambling at least once a week; 16 (50%) at least once 
16 
 
a month (see Table 1 for the demographic/psychometrics features). None of the participants met 
clinical cut-offs for probable pathological gambling (Grant et al., 2004). 
 
The 'Bone Game' 
One participants of each pair was randomly assigned to start as the shooter; the other participant 
started as the betting partner. Both participants were in the same room and played the Bone 
Game on a single shared computer terminal. However, each used their own computer mouse. 
 
As in Experiment 1, participants were shown an array of six faces of a standard die on a shared 
computer display (Figure 2a). An audio message indicated the shooter's winning number which 
was acknowledged with a single mouse click on the corresponding die-face. Clicking on the 
target winning number bet a standard stake of 35p on that outcome. Next, the betting partner was 
given the opportunity to bet their 35p stake on the same winning number as the shooter or to 
choose, and indicate, a different number. To bet on the same target winning number, the betting 
partner clicked on the ‘?’ sign beside the shooter’s target number. To bet on a different target 
winning number, the betting partner clicked on the ‘?’ sign beside an alternative number 
randomly assigned by the computer. After the betting partner had placed his bet, the shooter 
clicked the mouse again to roll a single simulated die for as long a duration as he or she liked 
before releasing the mouse button to 'throw' the die and reveal the play outcome. Hitting winning 
numbers paid out at 2-1 on the 35p stake. Stakes were returned if the shooter missed both his and 
the betting partner's winning number; the partner's stake was lost if the shooter hit his own 
winning number; and the shooter's stake was lost if he hit the partner's winning number.  
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The final feature of the game was the random assignment of a 'skull and crossbones' to one 
number other than the shooter's and betting partner's winning numbers. If the die-roll landed on 
this number, both participants forfeited their stakes and switched roles, with the shooter now 
becoming the betting partner, and vice versa. Participants were given 500p of 'house money' to 
play with and each play cost the shooter 5p. The sequence of plays were programmed so that, by 
the end of the game, both participants had rolled the simulated die 30 times as the shooter. 
Gamblers played a 2-min practice round of the game in pairs to acquaint themselves with the 
responses before starting on the experimental task which lasted for another 10mins. 
 
Procedure 
Participants completed the SCI-PG (Grant, Steinberg, Kim, Rounsaville, & Potenza, 2004) and 
the self-report questionnaires before playing the Bone Game. After this, participants completed 
the Dice-control Scale and collected their winnings before being discharged. 
 
Data Analysis 
First, mixed models were used to regress participants' (log-transformed) die-roll times against the 
(i) shooter’s target winning numbers (i.e., 1 to 6); (ii) betting partner’s target winning numbers 
(i.e., 1 to 6); (iii) ‘bone number’ (i.e., 1 to 6); (iv) the betting partner’s history of betting with the 
shooter (as measured by the proportion of partners' bets with the thrower in all preceding plays); 
and (v) the play number to account for fluctuating engagement across the game. In an additional 
model, an interaction predictor (vi) was added to investigate the interactive effect of the shooters' 
target values with betting partners' betting histories. Gamblers' intercepts and regressors (i), (ii) 
and (vi) were entered into the model as random effects while the remaining regressors were 
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entered as fixed effects. Second, as in Experiment 1, one-sample t-tests were conducted to 
explore the significance of the -coefficients of regressors (i) and (ii) that were taken from the 
previous analysis. Third, -coefficients for (vi) the interaction effect above were also regressed 
against predictors for age, non-verbal cognitive ability, GRCS-IOC subscale scores and, most 
importantly, beliefs in control captured by Dice-control Scale scores. 
 
Results 
Participants (while acting as 'shooters') allowed the simulated die to roll for longer while trying 
to hit larger target values as opposed to smaller values, b=0.056, 95% CI [0.019, 0.093], 
SE=0.019. This equates to an increase in roll-time of ≈25ms for every value increase in target 
winning number. Die-roll times were not much influenced by the value of partners' target 
numbers, b=0.010, 95% CI [-0.014, 0.034], SE=0.012, or the value of the 'bone' number, 
b=0.005, 95% CI [-0.019, 0.029], SE=0.012. However, shooters allowed the die to roll for longer 
as the proportion of partners' bets on the same target winning numbers increased, b=0.934, 95% 
CI [0.536, 1.332], SE=0.203. The association between die-roll times and shooters' target winning 
numbers – their action-based IOC  was strengthened with the proportion of shared bets between 
shooter and betting partner (Figure 2b), b=0.202, 95% CI [0.075, 0.329], SE=0.065  
 
Figure 2 about here 
 
Confirming again the statistical reliability of action-based OIC, one-sample t-tests showed that 
the association between die-roll times and shooters' target winning numbers (IOC) was 
significant, t(31)=5.05, p<.001, Cohen’s d=.89, and more so with bets on the same numbers by 
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betting partners, t(31)=9.22, p<.001, Cohen’s d=1.63. However, the moderation of shooters' 
action-based IOC by their partners' history of betting on the same winning numbers was not 
markedly related to their self-reported beliefs that they could use the dice to influence game 
outcomes (Table 3), b<0.001, 95% CI [-0.010, 0.009], SE=0.005, or their broader illusions of 
control as GRCS-IOC scores, b=0.006, 95% CI [-0.006, 0.018], SE=0.006.  
 
Table 3 about here 
 
Discussion 
These results replicate the demonstration that action expressions of IOC depend upon the prize 
structure of the die-rolling game (Lim et al., 2014) and, here, in Experiment 1. Regular gamblers 
with few gambling problems allow a simulated die to roll for durations that mapped on to their 
own target winning numbers rather than those chosen by a gambling co-actor or, indeed, 
numbers associated with the penalty of swapping between the roles of shooter and betting partner 
(the 'Bone' number). This indicates that action-based IOC are not simply automatic responses to 
magnitude features within dice games, but are tied principally to an individuals' own target (and 
intended) winning numbers. As hypothesised, we found that fluctuations of die-roll times as a 
function of shooters' target winning numbers were amplified by betting partners consistently 
betting on the same outcomes, suggesting that action-based IOC can be strengthened by the 
endorsements offered by congruent betting patterns of gambling co-actors. 
 
Finally, we did not find much evidence that gamblers' action-based IOC were linked to their self-
reported beliefs in the controllability of Bone Game outcomes (as captured by Dice-control Scale 
scores). Most likely, individuals' IOC in any gambling form are tethered to the most plausible 
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evidence that gambling outcomes are controllable. Possibly, in a social context, beliefs that 
actions can moderate the outcomes of dice-based gambling game are primarily driven by the 
immediate supportive evidence of other gambling partners' congruent betting patterns.  
  
Experiments 1 and 2 demonstrate how the action-based expression of IOC can reflect both the 
structural features of games and social facilitators. Experiment 3 now completes this series by 
examining testing directly whether it is possible to disrupt action-based IOC by inducing a state 
of motor caution through performace of a standard stop-signal task (Verbruggen et al., 2012)  
 
Experiment 3: Illusions of control and motor caution 
Community-recruited gamblers were randomly assigned to two groups. In the 'stop-signal 
training' group, participants completed a standard version of the stop-signal task before the 
'neutral' version of the die-rolling game used in Experiment 1 (that offered a single monetary 
prize of 35p for all winning target values); in the 'response-training' control group, participants 
completed a double-response motor training task (without an inhibitory component) before 
playing the single-player die-rolling game of Experiment 1. We tested the prediction that motor 
caution following a stop-signal task will disrupt associations between longer die-rolls and target 
winning numbers and, possibly, disturb control beliefs as captured by the Dice-control Scale. 
Method 
Participants  
Forty male gamblers were recruited from the local community (Table 1). Twenty-one 
participants (52.5%) gambled once a week or more; 19 (47.5%) gambled at least once a month. 
None met criteria for probable pathological gambling (i.e. SCI-PG scores ≥ 5; Grant et al., 2004).  
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Motor caution training (Verbruggen et al., 2012) 
Participants completed a binary-choice task to identify squares- or diamonds- presented as 
imperative signals, on a standard computer display, by clicking on two separate keys, 'c' and 'm' 
with the middle fingers of each hand. However, on 25% of the trials, these shapes were 
highlighted, indicating that participants should respond differently. In the stop-signal group, 
participants were instructed to refrain from responding (i.e. in the presence of the 'stop'’ signal); 
while participants in the response-training control group were instructed to respond as usual but 
with an additional press of the spacebar (i.e., as a 'double response' signal). Over the course of 10 
blocks of 72 trials, intervals between the imperative and stop signals were adjusted to ensure 
that, on average, participants withheld responses successfully on about 50% of the stop trials. 
 
Procedure 
Participants completed all questionnaires before two groups of 20 were randomised to one of the 
two experimental groups: the 'stop-signal training' and 'response-training' groups. Following the 
motor training, participants completed the same version of the computerised die-rolling game as 
for the 'neutral' group of Experiment 1. Following completion of the die-rolling game, 
participants completed the Dice-control Scale and were given their winnings in the game. 
 
Data Analysis 
Matching of demographic characteristic and gambling behavuours across the participant groups 
were explored using independent sample t-tests, Pearson χ2 tests, and non-parametric Kruskal-
Wallis tests. First, to model participants' action-based expression of IOC, mixed-effects models 
were first used to regress log-transformed die-roll times against the (i) winning target values (i.e., 
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1 to 6); (ii) wins or losses on the immediately previous play (i.e., win=1; loss=-1); and (iii) the 
play number in the game. Gamblers' intercepts and the coefficients of predictors (i) and (iii) were 
included  to vary randomly across participants. Second, these (action-based IOC) -coefficients 
were put through one-sample t-tests to explore the significance of these slopes within each 
participant group. Finally, these -coefficients were also regressed against experimental group 
('stop-signal training' against 'response-training') alongside predictors for age, non-verbal 
cognitive ability, Dice-control Scale scores and the GRCS-IOC subscale scores. A further model 
tested the interaction between group and Dice-control Scale scores.  
 
Results 
Participants of the stop-signal training and response-training groups were well-matched on 
demographic, clinical and gambling measures (p>.05; Table 1). Replicating the results of 
Experiments 1 and 2, gamblers tended to allow the die to roll for longer when attempting to 'hit' 
larger target values, b=0.066, 95% CI [0.027, 0.105], SE=0.020. This equates to an increase in 
roll-time of ≈55ms for every single value increase in target winning number. Die-roll times 
tended to be shorter in later stages of the game, b= -0.011, 95% CI [-0.017, -0.005], SE=0.003.  
 
One-sample t-test showed that action-based IOC (as longer roll-times when trying to hit higher  
target winning numbers) were significant in both the stop-signal training group, t(19)=3.34, 
p<.01, Cohen’s d=.75, and response-training control group, t(19)=2.98, p<.01, Cohen’s d=.67. 
Participants in the stop-signal training group did not show any overall change in their action-
based IOC compared with those in the response-training group; i.e. the strength of association 
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between die-roll times and target winning numbers did not differ markedly (Model 1 of Table 4), 
b= -0.047, 95% CI [-0.112, 0.017], SE=0.032. 
 
As in Experiment 1, participants' action-based IOC were positively associated with stronger 
beliefs in the possibility of influencing the outcomes of the die-rolling game, b=0.007, 95% CI 
[0.001, 0.013], SE=0.003. Critically, the association between action-based IOC and dice-control 
beliefs was significantly diminished following stop-signal training, b=-0.015 95% CI [-0.025, -
0.004], SE=0.005 (Figure 3 and Model 2 of Table 4). Furthermore, the β-coefficient for this 
interaction remained statistically significant after removing thirteen participants with low dice-
control beliefs (i.e., those who reported 'strongly disagree' to every item on the Dice-Control 
scale), b= -0.021, 95% CI [-0.041, -0.001], SE=0.009.     
 
Table 4 and Figure 3 about here 
 
Discussion 
Experiment 3 demonstrates that an induction of motor caution following completion of a stop-
signal task can diminish the expression of longer roll-times to 'hit' higher value winning numbers 
but, specifically, only in gamblers with relatively strong self-reported beliefs that they could 
influence the outcomes of the die-rolling game (as scores on the Dice-Control scale). These 
findings demonstrate that brief motor-caution training not only diminishes risk-taking behaviour 
in healthy (non-gambling) individuals (Stevens et al., 2015; Verbruggen et al., 2012) and other 
health-relevant behaviours  (Allom, Mullan, & Hagger, 2016; Jones et al., 2016) but can, in some 
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gamblers at least, decouple instrumental attempts to manipulate a simulated die-roll to secure 
winning outcomes from their beliefs that these manipulations can be successful.  
 
General discussion 
Three experiments addressed the psychological mechanisms that mediate action-based illusions 
of control (IOC) in a simulated dice-rolling game for small monetary prizes.  All three 
experiments replicate the finding that gamblers can express IOC in the actions afforded by dice-
based games (Lim et al., 2014). These findings are unlikely to be attributable to uncontrolled 
variation in gambling problems within or between samples since (self-reported) clinical 
symptoms were low across all three experiments. Similarly, the findings cannot be attributed to 
the frequency of winning outcomes since the die-rolling outcomes were matched for 
comparisons within games and across participant groups. Rather, our findings suggest that action 
or motor-based biases within games of dice provide gamblers with the opportunity to express, in 
instrumental terms, their beliefs in their control over game outcomes (Wegner, 2004). 
 
Die-rolling, illusions of control and prize structures 
Experiment 1 demonstrated that action-based expressions of IOC in a die-rolling game is 
modulated by the correspondence between actions afforded by games and their prize structure 
(Kornblum et al., 1990). Specifically, our findings show that action-based IOC can be attenuated 
when one element of the game's structure is compatible with the available actions (higher 
winning numbers  longer die-rolls) while another element is incompatible (higher prize values 
 shorter die-rolls) compared to when both elements are compatible (higher winning numbers + 
larger prize values  longer die-rolls). Other aspects of numeric processing can be expressed in 
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motor behaviour (Andres et al., 2004; Lindemann et al., 2007). Hand-grasping and -releasing 
speeds are quicker when responding to smaller and larger numbers, respectively (Andres et al., 
2004) while people tend to execute small finger actions (as 'precision grips') faster when they see 
small numbers, and execute large grasping actions (as 'power grips') faster, and with more force, 
when they see large numbers (Lindemann et al., 2007). Our data suggest that the actions inherent 
in gambling games can activate shared mental representations of magnitude (Walsh, 2003), and 
that IOC in these games can be 'scaffolded' upon these underlying stimulus-response 
correspondences. Possibly, action-based IOC are modulated by the actions afforded by games 
with congruent prize structures (cf. Gibson, 1979), such as slots games that offer 'ladders' in 
which success at the higher steps offer larger prizes (Parke & Griffiths, 2006). 
 
Die-rolling, illusions of control and social features 
Experiment 2 showed that action-based IOC can reflect the joint betting patterns of a gambling 
co-actor. Experiment 2 shows that, in dice-rolling games, action-based IsOC can reflect the joint 
betting patterns of a gambling co-actor. Social facilitation of gambling can arise through several 
mechanisms. First, social facilitation can result in the transmission of erroneous beliefs in multi-
player gambling games (Delfabbro, 2004). Individuals can increase risk-taking patterns on slot-
machines having learned about the gambling successes of other players (Kearney & Drabman, 
1992; Le Floch et al., 2005; Rockloff & Dyer, 2007; Wohl & Enzle, 2009); while observation of 
betting patterns can communicate mistaken and statistically inefficient beliefs about prize 
structures (Caron & Ladouceur, 2003; Lefrancois, Chase, & Joyce, 1988). Possibly, the 
behevauoural consequences of the transmission of erroneous beliefs between gambling co-
actores are consolidated by broader processes such as social conformity.  
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Secondly, social facilitation of gambling can also increase skill-orientation (Langer, 1975) that 
can be enhanced by learning about other gamblers' 'successes and failures' (Caron & Ladouceur, 
2003; Dykstra & Dollinger, 1990; Le Floch et al., 2005) or competition with others (Dewey, 
Seiffert, & Carr, 2010). Observations of joint betting patterns can also offer social contexts that 
strengthen (mistaken) beliefs about personal skill (Langer, 1975). Thus, the congruent betting of  
gambling co-actors in the Bone Game of Experiment 2 may have been interpreted as 
endorsements of shooters' ability to hit target winning numbers (Wohl & Enzle, 2009).  
 
Die-rolling, illusions of control and motor activation 
Experiment 3 demonstrated that an induced state of motor caution – through the completion of a 
standard stop-signal task – can decouple the link between action-based IOC and self-reported 
beliefs that it is possible to use the die to influence game outcomes. The induced state produced 
by the stop-signal task might involve the facilitation of an activated braking system to suppress 
motor responses to imperative signals once they have been initiated (Jahfari et al., 2010); or the 
proactive adjustment of response strategies that slow responses to minimise response errors 
(Verbruggen and Logan 2009). Whichever is the case, the results of Experiment 3 suggest that an 
induction of motor-caution has the capacity to interrupt instrumental attempts to exert control 
over gambling outcomes in gamblers who hold strong explicit beliefs on control.  
 
Clinical and harm-minimisation implications 
Current conceptions of how structural characteristics of gambling games can enhance the risk of 
gambling harms focus on the static features such as losses-disguised-as-wins, returns to player, 
‘near-misses’, as well as sensory features such as console lights and sounds (Dixon et al, 2015; 
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Loba, Stewart, Klein, & Blackburn, 2001; Parke & Griffiths, 2006; Reid, 1986). The findings 
from Experimental 1 and 2 highlight the potential for gambling-related harms to be amplified by 
the actions – and sense of active involvement – afforded by both structural and social features of 
games in vulnerable individuals. Our findings also raise the possibility of identifying 
complementary assays of IOCs as clinical outcomes of interventions that focus upon cognitive 
biases and errors such as cognitive behavioural therapy (Cowlishaw et al., 2012). 
 
Still other data suggest that high rates of play on gambling machines may increase the risks of 
gambling-related harms (Linnet et al. 2010; Blaszczynski et al. 2001; Choliz 2010; Ladoucer and 
Sevigny 2006; Mentzoni et al. 2012; Worhunsky et al, 2017) and are associated with enhanced 
striatal dopamine release in pathological gamblers (Boileau et al. 2014). It is reasonable to 
assume that fast rates of play are associated with facilitatation of the motor actions required to 
play and control the game features, and raise the possibility that rapid rates of play increase the 
risk of harms by strengthening action-based IOC and their associated beliefs in control. Equally, 
it follows that putative harm-minimisation interventions or devices that reduce rates of play on 
machines may reduce the risks of harm by weakening action-based IOC. Possibly, such 
interventions might be most helpful for gamblers who show particular impairments in impulse or 
inhibitory control (Leeman & Potenza, 2012). These, however, are possibilities for the future.  
 
Limitations and future research 
We acknowledge that our findings are subject to several limitations. First, our computer-
simulated die-rolling game has an artificiality compared to, for example, live casino craps or Sic-
Bo in Asia. Nevertheless, lab-based experiments afford opportunities to test underlying 
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mechanisms and, we argue, provide insights into the structure and expression of IOC in 
commercial games. Second, another limitation reflects our choice of experimental participants.  
Further work will be needed to test these findings in female gamblers who sometimes show 
weaker gambling-related cognitive biases (Raylu & Oei, 2004; Wardle et al., 2010). 
Nevertheless, our results can probably generalise to the majority of male gamblers and point to 
future study of action-based IOC in individuals with significant gambling problems.  
 
Finally, we acknowledge that we recruited relatively small samples of community gamblers. 
However, the repeated replication of our main findings across all studies, including Lim et al. 
(2014), and the consistent support of our main hypotheses suggest that the demonstration of 
action-based illusions of control are robust.  
 
Notwithstanding these concerns, these findings extend previous investigations of IOC as 
declarative (if also false) propositional beliefs about gambling action-outcome contingencies. 
Our findings suggest that in gambling forms with an active involvement component, IOC can be 
partly 'embodied' in the motor, muscular and somatic systems that express them (Proffitt, 2006).   
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Table 1.  
Descriptive statistics and group differences of gamblers in experiments 1, 2 and 3. 
   Mean (SD) 
 
Experiment 1 
(n= 60) 
 
 Experiment 2 
(n = 32) 
 
Experiment 3 
(n = 40) 
 
 
Congruent 
Group 
(n = 20) 
 
Incongruent 
Group 
(n = 20) 
 
Neutral 
Group 
(n = 20) 
 
p-value 
  
 
Stop-signal  
Training  
Group 
(n = 20) 
 
Response  
Training  
Group 
(n = 20) 
 
p-value 
Age 28.9(11.2) 28.3(11.2) 28.9(9.1) >.05a  28.8(10.1)  29.5(10.4) 28.9(9.6) >.05d 
Non-verbal cognitive ability 45.6(12.8) 46.1(11.0) 49.5(8.2) >.05a  50.1(7.0)  50.7(6.9) 49.6(8.4) >.05d 
Gambling problems 0.7(1.4) 0.7(1.7) 0.6(2.0) >.05b   1.0(1.5)  0.4(1.1) 0.3(0.7) >.05b  
           
Gambling frequency, N (%)    >.05c      >.05c 
 Once a week or more 11(55.0) 16(80.0) 11(55.0)   16(50.0)  11(55.0) 10(50.0)  
 Less than once a week 9(45.0) 4(20.0) 9(45.0)   16(50.0)  9(45.0) 10(50.0)  
           
Gambling-related Cognitions           
  Illusions of control/ GRCS-IOC 6.1(2.9) 8.4(4.4) 5.9(3.5) >.05a  7.2(4.9)  6.2(4.3) 7.0(4.9) >.05d 
 Total score/ GRCS 55.7(15.6) 62.2(20.9) 56.1(17.9) >.05a  56.2(22.5)  55.6(21.5) 53.5(21.5) >.05d 
Note: Non-verbal cognitive ability as measured by the Raven’s Progressive Matrices (Raven, 2000); Gambling problems as measured by the 
Structured Clinical Interview for Pathological Gambling  (SCI-PG; Grant et al., 2004); Gambling-related Cognitions as measured by the 
Gambling-related Cognitions Scale (Raylu & Oei, 2004); a One-way Analysis of Variance (ANOVA); b non-parametric Kruskal-Wallis test 
(distribution within groups was non-normal); c χ2 test (fewer than 20% of the contingency table cells had frequencies < 5); d Independent sample t-
test.
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Table 2.  
Experiment 1. Two regressions of participant β-coefficient values (for target winning numbers) 
against experimental groups (correspondences of game features and prize values), dice-control 
beliefs, trait illusions of control, age and non-verbal cognitive ability in 60 gamblers 
 Model 1 Model 2 
 b SE b β b SE b β 
Constant -.011 .043  -.013 .044  
Age .000 .001 .058 .000 .001 .049 
Non-verbal cognitive ability/Ravens .000 .001 .034 .000 .001 .030 
Trait illusions of control/GRCS-IOC -.003 .002 -.214 -.003 .002 -.232 
Perceived dice control/Dice-control Beliefs Scale .004 .001 .443** .005 .002 .508* 
Congruent (vs. Neutral) .010 .014 .097 .012 .027 .117 
Incongruent (vs. Neutral)  -.035 .014 -.358* -.020 .030 -.202 
Perceived dice control*Congruent (vs. Neutral) - - - .000 .003 -.017 
Perceived dice control*Incongruent (vs. Neutral) - - - -.002 .003 -.188 
Note: R2 = .30 (Models 1 and 2); *p < .05; **p < .01; Ravens – Raven’s Progressive Matrices (Raven, 
2000); GRCS-IOC – scores on the IOC subscale of the Gambling Related Cognitions Scale (Raylu & Oei, 
2004); Dice-control Beliefs Scale – scores on the adapted state measure of mistaken beliefs that the 
animated die can be controlled (Ladouceur & Sevigny, 2005); Congruent, Incongruent, Neutral – 
experimental conditions of the die-rolling game. 
 
 
 
 
  
Commented [A5]: Matthew, I’m not sure this is how Raylu & 
Oei reference this sub-scale; is this acronym right? If not, correct 
throughout - R 
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Table 3.  
Experiment 2. Regression of participant β-values (for the interaction effect of die target values 
and joint betting) against dice-control beliefs and trait illusions of control, controlling for age and 
non-verbal cognitive ability in 32 gamblers completing a dyadic dice-rolling game ('Bone 
Game'); see text. 
 b SE b β 
Constant .105 .226  
Age <.001 .003 -.020 
Non-verbal cognitive ability/Ravens .002 .004 .088 
Trait illusions of control/GRCS-IOC .006 .006 .205 
Perceived dice control/Dice-control Beliefs Scale <.001 .005 -.012 
Note: R2 = .04; Ravens – Raven’s Progressive Matrices (Raven, 2000); GRCS-IOC – scores on the IOC 
subscale of the Gambling Related Cognitions Scale (Raylu & Oei, 2004). 
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Table 4.  
Experiment 3. Two regressions of participant β-values (for die target winning numbers) against 
experimental training group and dice-control scores, controlling for trait illusions of control, age 
and non-verbal cognitive ability in 40 gamblers that received or did not receive an induction of 
motor caution before completing a simulated dice-rolling game for small monetary prizes. 
 Model 1 Model 2 
 B 
 
SE B 
 
β 
 
B 
 
SE B 
 
β 
 
Constant .089 .130  -.084 .134  
Age <-.001 .002 -.002 .001 .002 .103 
Non-verbal cognitive ability/Ravens -.001 .002 -.064 .000 .002 .008 
Trait illusions of control/GRCS-IOC -.004 .004 -.168 -.004 .004 -.159 
Perceived dice control/Dice-control Scale .007 .003 .393* .016 .004 .929*** 
Group/stop-signal vs double-response training -.047 .032 -.234 .102 .060 .502 
Perceived dice control*Experimental condition - - - -.015 .005 -1.025*** 
Note: R2 = .35 (Model 2); *p < .05; ***p < .001; Ravens – Raven’s Progressive Matrices (Raven, 2000); 
GRCS-IOC – scores on the IOC subscale of the Gambling Related Cognitions Scale (Raylu & Oei, 2004); 
Dice-control Scale – Adapted state measure of mistaken beliefs that the animated die can be controlled 
(Ladouceur & Sevigny, 2005); Group/stop signal training vs. response training on a motor caution task; 
Model 2 includes the interaction term for group * Dice control score. 
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Figure 1 
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Figure 2 
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Figure 3  
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Figure captions 
Figure 1 (a) The top panels illustrate the 3 different experimental conditions of the Die-rolling game; the 
incongruent, neutral and congruent groups. The arrow indicates a play sequence of the incongruent 
experimental condition in the Die-rolling Game. The computer reads out ‘2’ as the target and gamblers 
acknowledge the target by clicking on the prize above the announced target (i.e., 50p in this case). Once 
this is done, the option to click and spin an animated die is given. Participants click to spin the die and 
upon release the animation slows and presents the outcome. In this play sequence, the participant obtains 
the target 2 and wins the 50p prize; and (b) plot of gambler-centred roll-time (log ms) as a function of the 
size of die targets. 
 
Figure 2 (a) An example of a display sequence for one play of the 'Bone Game'; in this instance, the 
computer reads out '3' as the 'shooter's ('Matt's') target. Matt would win 70p if he rolled the number 3, but 
lose 35p if he rolled the number 6; conversely, the betting partner ('Pat') would win 70p if the participant 
1 rolled the number 6, but lose 35p if he rolled the number 3. All bets are returned if the numbers 2, 4, 
and 5 are rolled, and all bets are forfeited if the skull and crossbones target of 1 is rolled. In this go, the 
number 3 is obtained, so the shooter wins and the betting partner loses; (b) Mean (and SEs) of thirty two 
gambler-centred die-roll times in milliseconds (natural logarithmic transformed) as a function of target 
winning number and joint or shared betting patterns of the 'shooter' and the 'betting partner'. 
 
Figure 3 Plot of forty regular (but not problematic) gamblers' tendency to roll dice for longer when 
attempting large targets, as a function of Dice-control Scale scores; lines represent the experimental 
conditions of stop-signal training (black line) versus response training (grey line). 
 
  
42 
 
Footnote 
i (Bank) craps is the most popular casino-based table game that has a vital aspect of active involvement through the 
rolling of (pairs of) dice to win bets on combinations of dice outcomes for monetary prizes. 
                                                 
